








# Internet Sanctions on Russian Media: Actions and Effects

John Kristoff, Moritz Müller, Arturo Filastò, Max Resing, Chris Kanich, Niels ten Oever

#### **Timeline - Prelude and Initial Reactions**



# **Initial Internet Vendors and Community Reactions**



#### **Motivation**



### The Internet Sanctions Project

## Welcome to the Internet Sanctions Project

This is an open, Internet community governed, project which produces real-time BGP and RPZ data feeds of network resou and domain names) associated with sanctioned entities. These data feeds facilitate Internet network operators in complyi against violators of international and human rights law.

#### Why does this project exist?

Sanctions have been used as a tool of statecraft for thousands of years, but their use has become particularly widespread sanctions used since the Second World War and until the start of the new Millennium were employed through the United I at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has meant that a number of national governments and regional graphication

## **Research Questions**

#### **Compliance**

Are Internet-based sanctions being implemented?

#### Methodology

How are Internet sanctions implemented and enforced?

#### Results

How effective (consistent and complete) is enforcement?

#### **Measurement Platforms Overview**

**OONI** 

**RIPE Atlas** 


eduVPN


**Dataplane.org** 

**NLNOG RING** 











News Introduction Participants Security
User Guide Toolbox Contact Patrons

#### Introduction

#### Motivation

I've noticed that there are a lot of friendly 'shell access' exchange deals between network operators. This makes it easier for parties to debug network issues and troubleshoot 'from the outside'. A point of view outside your network is absolutely essential, seeing what others see is a useful thing with a variety of network problems. Well known examples are 'it works for even numbered ip address, but not for odd numbered ip address via this and this route'.

#### What Internet Resources in a Sanctions List?

Internet identifiers historically an afterthought

We focused on primary domain names of sanctioned media


Based primarily on EU decisions ("packages")

We also consider the US OFAC list and control resources


# How was sanctioning measured?

Platform	IP/TCP	DNS	TLS	HTTP(S)
OONI	TCP only	/	/	HTTPS only
RIPE Atlas	X	1	X	X
EduVPN	1	/	X	✓
Dataplane.org	/	X	X	<b>✓</b>
NLNOG RING	/	X	×	/


#### 77% of enforcement occurs within first three months




# **Blocking methods as seen by OONI**




# **DNS Blocking as Seen by RIPE Atlas**



# **Blocking as seen from NRENs**



# Network-layer blocking as seen from hosting providers



# User-view of sanctions - (NL) "per request of the EU"




#### Deze pagina is onbereikbaar

Op verzoek van de EU is dit domein momenteel geblokkeerd. We zijn ons bewust van de discussie en bezwaren over het blokkeren van websites, maar geven hiermee gevolg aan een expliciete opdracht vanuit de overheid. Bovenal hopen we dat de oorlog in Oekraïne snel voorbij is en proberen we waar nodig te helpen.





## **User-view of sanctions - (AT) block list with start date**



# **User-view of sanctions - (PT) generic block list**







Os conteúdos a que está a tentar aceder encontram-se bloqueados e estão protegidos por Direitos de Autor e Direitos Conexos.

O seu acesso, utilização e/ou divulgação, sem autorização do respetivo titular, é crime previsto e punido por Lei.

#### **Discussion**

**Blocking transparency** 

Mirror pages

**Sanctions enforcement in NRENs** 

**Enforcement mechanism placement** 

## **Conclusions**

Coordination, inconsistency, and precision

**Future work** 

# Thank you, contact information

Contact: John Kristoff

- jkrist3@uic.edu jtk@dataplane.org
- https://dataplane.org/jtk/
- @infosec.exchange@jtk